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Roberts' main theme is the tension between "affirmation" and "alterity," 
viz. Nietzsche's conviction that in all experience a contradiction exists, so that 
of everything that is presented the opposite also holds good (204-12). The 
method here is to assert as true the principle that each definite assertion 
concerning experience has to be set over its other, in forms or tropes, not in 
propositions. There is no selection of dogma or doctrine- say, materialism 
over idealism, or atheism over theism- but only that which leads or directs 
us to live rightly and think correctly. This method, Roberts maintains, does 
not work against religion as such, i.e. , against the religious imagination. The 
religious imagination is rather its weapon of defence, and Nietzsche was 
conscious of this. He uses that weapon against both ancient and modern 
versions of materialism and idealism. Though he always expresses himself as 
if everything were in 'process' only, Nietzsche goes further towards genuine 
religiosity than those whose criterion of truth and standard of excellence 
must be either sensuous perception or reflective rhottghr (2 12-14) 
This is the relation of Nietzsche to religion, if put quite abstractly. A 
word of caution: neither Roberts nor Nietzsc_he himself really understands the 
sceptical nature of this standpoint. Roberts makes much of Nietzsche's art of 
demonstrating opposites through tropes, whereby the withholding of assent 
comes about, as also the possibility of religious affirmation. But Nietzsche 
can affirm nothing in religion except the will to illusion, to masks, to superfi-
ciality; he can affirm nothing but this because for him life itself is based on 
illusion, deception , appearances, the necessity of perspective and of error. 
From this point of view everything he asserts is opposed to the positive, even 
though this is founded on a carefully thought out annihilation of all that is 
held to be true, so that all is made transient. That is, Nietzsche only arrives at 
a negative standpoint and can proceed no further. He thinks that this negativ-
ity is likewise a wondrous affirmation, for it is the self-transcending experi-
ence or infinite process of life. A tme knowledge of religion would also 
comprehend the negaLiviLy of Lhis proce~~. The Jifferellce is Llial Nielz~clle 
remains at the negative result, arguing that everything determinate- whether 
natural or spiritual-has an internal contradiction, that it destroys itself and 
consequently does not exist. 
Kenneth Kierans University of King's College 
Dilemmas of Trust. By Trudy Govier. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen's UP, 1998. x, 246 pages. $29.95. 
Tmdy Govier is known to many Canadian philosophers as the author of lively 
introductory texts on philosophy and reasoning. She has recently produced 
two volumes on trust. It was Annette Baier's 1986 paper, "Tmst and Anti-
tmst"- its title alluding to American commercial legislation, but its substance 
BooK REVIEws • 131 
touching the core of ethics-that made trust a notable concept in contempo-
rary philosophy. Govier's first volume, Social Trust and Human Communi-
ties (1997), deals with socio-political issues of trust, while Dilemmas of Trust 
discusses the role of trust in personal relationships, particularly those among 
friends and family members. 
Whether Govier should have tried to separate the socio-political from 
the personal dimensions of trust is a question some readers might ask them-
selves. We could neither thrive nor survive without trust, according to Govier, 
so when it diminishes or dies out in personal relationships, usually the parties 
should work hard at forgiveness and reconciliation. However, as feminists 
have long argued, personal relations are often the sites of oppression and 
abuse. That is why Baier urged that sometimes it is appropriate to be "anti-
trusting" rather than trusting: sometimes we need to resist any inclination 
towards forgiveness and will ourselves not to trust someone who has be-
trayed us in the past. Betrayal often has a political dimension, which explains 
how pervasive it can be in certain kinds of relationships. We cannot bracket 
the political from the personal in discussions a~out trust. 
Govier takes issue with people who claim that most families are dys-
functional in ways that are damaging to our ability to trust in ourselves and in 
others. She argues that most families are "good enough" for us to experience 
and learn about trust. However, the term "good enough" is dangerous, for 
often it is used to cut off meaningful discussion: ·Ah, their relationship is 
good enough, so stop wonying about it. ' We are not yet ready to end discus-
sion about what sorts of family dynamics are important for teaching people 
how to trust well, and about whether those dynamics are present in most 
families . 
Still, Dilemmas of Trust is interesting in its focus on those very dilem-
mas. A typical one is that without trust we will not find love, but only when 
we trust can our heart be broken. Another is that evidence of trustworthiness 
is often ambiguous, and so sometimes we are unsure of whether to trust at 
all. Some philosophers will seek rational solutions to such dilemmas, but 
Govier does not pretend to be able to do so. Instead, she explores everyday 
examples and considers what are good and bad reasons for trusting and 
distrusting. There is a lot of good sense in that discussion, but little in the way 
of formal solutions. 
The dilemmas Govier discusses could be handled in more fruitful 
ways if she were clearer on the nature of trust and trustworthiness . She is 
often ambiguous about what distinguishes trust from attitudes such as confi-
dence, reliance, and respect. At the end of the book, she describes trustwor-
thiness as a moral stance, of being concerned abour the welfare of others 
(210), but near the beginning she uses an example of some Nazi prisoners 
who supposedly were "trustworthy" to their captors (13). "Consistent trust-
worthiness" is the solution Govier offers to the dilemma of how to restore 
trust without putting oneself at grave risk of harm. However, that advice is 
vague in the absence of a clearly spelled-our conception of uustworthiness. 
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Govier has attempted to write both for the professional philosopher 
and for the 'lay reader,' which might explain why she avoids some of the 
analytical work of clarifying the nature of trust and trustworthiness. Her book 
is accessible and weaves together in interesting ways reports on theoretical 
literature, CBC phone-in testimony, philosophical argument, anecdote, socio-
logical surveys, and silly self-help literature (of which she offers some well-
aimed criticism). It also gives the first sustained treatment in ethics of "self-
trust, " a fascinating variant on interpersonal trust. Whatever their background, 
most readers will find that discussion illuminating. 
Steven Burns 
Carolyn Mcleod 
Dalhousie University 
University of Minnesota 
From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of 
Modern French Democracy. By Sudhir Hazareesingh. Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1998. xii, 393 pages. $19.95 US paper. 
The principal aim of Sudhir Hazareesingh's recent book is to challenge the 
prevalent scholarly opinion that modern French citizenship, as an ideology 
and a practice, was the creation of the Third Republic. Hazareesingh wishes 
to draw the attention of scholars to the largely ignored public debates during 
the Second Empire about citizenship, in particular as these involve considera-
tions of decentralization. It is his contention that a conception of modern 
citizenship arose directly out of these ideological disputes, thus preparing the 
foundations for the Third Republic. He concludes his book as follows: "it was 
very probably because this broad sense of citizenship was not only accepted 
but also practiced by a very wide section of society by the late 1860s that the 
republic was able to establish itself, in the measured words of Littre , as 'the 
regime that best allows time to keep its just preponderance"' (321). 
While Hazareesingh does provide a valuable summary and analysis of 
the views of the four most significant political groupings in the public discus-
sions surrounding citizenship and decentralization during the Second Em-
pire, he is unable to sustain the claim that he makes in the last sentence of his 
book. The problem lies less in the validity of his analysis than in the limita-
tions of his methodology. Hazareesingh takes up the approach initiated by 
scholars such as Quentin Skinner and ].G.A. Pocock in their work in the 
history of political thought: namely, to analyze ideologies as 'speech acts' 
within a set of linguistic practices. While this approach can be helpful in 
articulating the political thought of an individual or period, it is less helpful as 
an explanation of the actions of those involved in political processes. 
Hazareesingh justifies his claim that decentralization and citizenship were 
interconnected and central concerns in the public debates of the Second 
Empire. But his further claim that these ideological articulations provided the 
